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ABSTRACT 
 
Do Employer Preferences Contribute to Sticky Floors? 
 
We investigate the importance of employer preferences in explaining Sticky Floors, the 
pattern that women are, compared to men, less likely to start to climb the job ladder. To this 
end we perform a randomised field experiment in the Belgian labour market and test whether 
hiring discrimination based on gender is heterogeneous by the promotion characteristics of 
the selected jobs. We find that women get 33% less interview invitations when they apply for 
jobs implying a first promotion in functional level. On the other hand, their hiring chances are 
not significantly affected by the job authority level of the job. 
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1 Introduction 
During the last decade, economists have attempted to identify Sticky Floors in the 
labour market, thereby building on the seminal work by Booth et al. (2003). Sticky 
Floors can be described as the pattern that women are, compared to men, less 
likely to start to climb the job ladder. Thereby Sticky Floors complement the well-
known concept of Glass Ceilings which implies that women are less like to reach 
the top of the job ladder.1 Evidence for the existence of Sticky Floors has been 
found in countries such as Australia (Johnston and Lee, 2012), Italia (Filippin and 
Ichino, 2005), Spain (Gradín and del Río, 2009), Thailand (Fang and Sakellariou, 
2011) and the United States (Baker, 2003). In Belgium, the country where the 
present study is accomplished, Deschacht et al. (2011) conclude, based on their 
discrete time event history analysis of the Panel Study of Belgian Households data 
(1994-2001), that women near the top face fewer obstacles to promotions than 
women in the lower- and mid-career levels. In addition, Belgium is one of the 12 
European countries in which Christofides et al. (2013), investigating the gender 
wage gap across 24 EU member states, found evidence for Sticky Floors. 
From a policy perspective, it is important to determine the nature of the 
phenomenon of Sticky Floors in order to design adequate policy actions. Based on 
the mentioned literature, however, it is unclear whether Sticky Floors result from 
gender differences in human capital, preferences and behaviour at the employee 
side or from preferences (and unequal treatment) at the employer side. In our 
study, we contribute to the literature by investigating the importance of employer 
preferences (and thereby discrimination) in explaining Sticky Floors, keeping 
employee characteristics constant.2  
                                                     
1 See Albrecht et al. (2003), Arulampalam et al. (2007), Booth (2009), Chzhen and Mumford (2011), Reuben et al. 
(2012), Russo and Hassink (2012), Smith et al. (2013) and Weinberger (2011) for some seminal and recent 
contributions to the literature on Glass Ceilings. 
2 Throughout this article the terms “employer preferences” and “employer discrimination” are used to point to 
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More concretely, we aim at answering the question whether unequal 
treatment of equally productive male and female job candidates by employers is 
heterogeneous by whether or not they apply for jobs implying a (first) 
promotion.3 Unfavourable treatment of females in the access to these positions 
can be expected based on the theoretical models of discrimination introduced by 
Becker (1957) and Arrow (1973).4 Discrimination against women applying for 
higher positions could result from the general distaste that employers, co-workers 
and customers may have to collaborate with women in these higher positions, 
potentially related to the traditional overrepresentation of men in these positions. 
Furthermore, employers could expect a higher average productivity from males 
relative to females in leading positions. This may relate to the match between 
these positions and more “masculine” characteristics such as dominance, 
autonomy and assertiveness on the one hand and the fact that females are 
documented as having, on average, a less continuous and committed labour 
market participation related to the traditional division of labour within the 
household and maternity leave (Baumle, 2009; Blandford, 2003; Budig and 
England, 2001; Gimenez-Nadal and Sevilla, 2012; Gordo, 2009; Petit, 2007). 
To the best of our knowledge, all former studies on gender differences in 
                                                                                                                                       
the general concept of unequal appraisal and treatment of women and men in the labour market in respect of 
employers. Therefore, these concepts do not refer to the narrower theoretical concept of Becker’s (1957) 
“employer discrimination”. 
3 This implies that we do not investigate unequal treatment in promotions within the firm. We come back to this 
issue in Section 2.6. 
4 These theories are based on neoclassical assumptions and have been criticised concerning different aspects – 
see, e.g., Bergmann (1989) in the context of gender based discrimination in the labour market. In spite of the 
development of alternative approaches to theorising discrimination such as the models of opportunistic 
discrimination, implicit discrimination, noncompeting groups and lexicographic search by employers (Altonji and 
Blank, 1999; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004; Darity and Mason, 1998; Harbaugh and To, 2014), however, many 
recent contributions to the discrimination literature are still guided by the theoretical framework of the models 
of taste-based and statistical discrimination (Charles and Guryan, 2008; Borjas, 2009). Moreover, while some 
newer models are particularly applicable to the case of ethnic discrimination, the models of Becker (1957) and 
Arrow (1973) can be applied to the case of gender discrimination in a natural way. 
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promotion opportunities have used regression-based methods on observational 
data (typically household survey or labour force data). The most common 
approach consists of Oaxaca-Blinder style decompositions of wage differentials in 
a part explained by observables related to human capital and occupational 
characteristics and an unexplained part pointing in the direction of discrimination 
(Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder 1973). Residual gaps at the top of the wage distribution are 
interpreted then as complementary with the Glass Ceiling concept while residual 
gaps at the bottom of the wage distribution point in the direction of Sticky Floors. 
In their survey of experimental advances in the study of gender differentials in the 
labour market, Azmat and Petrongolo (Forthcoming) formulate two important 
drawbacks of using observational data to measure gender discrimination. First, 
most observational data do not capture some of the determinants of a worker’s 
productivity (e.g. motivation and intrinsic ability) which may be observed – and 
valued – by employers. Stated otherwise, based on these non-experimental data, 
researchers cannot control all variables employers take into account when making 
their hiring and remuneration decisions. As a result, no conclusive evidence of 
discrimination can be provided based on these data. Second, if pre-market 
investments in human capital or decisions to apply for a job implying a promotion 
are affected by the expectation of future labour market discrimination, the impact 
of discrimination is partly captured by observable human capital and occupational 
characteristics. 
To overcome the stated methodological problems, this study is novel in its 
approach to gather original experimental data on gender differences in promotion 
opportunities and thereby lets – as argued by Duflo (2006) – “the research 
question determine the data to be obtained instead of the data determining the 
questions that can be asked.” More concretely, we send out 576 pairs of fictitious 
job applications of individuals with about 5 years of job experience in their first 
and current job to vacancies for jobs requiring at least some and at most 5 years 
of experience. The two applications within each pair are similar, except for the 
revealed gender of the candidate. By monitoring the reaction from the employer 
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side, unequal treatment based on this single characteristic can be identified. This 
measure can be given a causal interpretation because all the information the 
employer receives is under control of the researcher so that selection on 
individual unobservables is eliminated. We send fictitious applications to 
vacancies implying a promotion in terms of occupational level and/or job 
authority compared with the current job of the candidate and to vacancies that 
are at the same functional and authority level as the current job. Thereby, we are 
able to test whether unequal treatment of young men and women in the labour 
market is heterogeneous based on the promotion characteristics of the jobs they 
apply for.5 If employer preferences contribute to Sticky Floors, unequal treatment 
of male and female job candidates should be relatively more to the disadvantage 
of women who apply for a job implying a promotion. This is our research 
hypothesis. 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. We first provide the 
reader with the design of our randomised field experiment aimed at measuring 
gender discrimination in hiring and heterogeneity in this discrimination by the 
promotion aspects of the tested jobs. In the third section, we present our 
research results, based on a statistical examination of the experimentally 
gathered data. Finally, we end with a conclusion about the research and some 
policy recommendations. 
                                                     
5 Stated otherwise, one can argue that a potential gender differential in call-back chances for a job implying a 
promotion at a new firm is comprised by a gender differential in hiring chances at a new firm and a gender 
differential in call-back for jobs implying a promotion. As we apply both for jobs implying a promotion and for 
jobs implying no promotion, our experimentally gathered data allows us to isolate the latter gender differential.  
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2 The Experiment 
2.1 Causal Evidence of Gender Discrimination by means of a 
Correspondence Experiment 
In order to answer our research question, we conducted a correspondence 
experiment. Within this experiment, pairs of fictitious job applications were sent 
to real vacancies. The applications within each pair were very comparable except 
for the gender of the applicant. By monitoring the subsequent call-back from the 
employer side, discrimination based on this single characteristic could be 
measured and given a causal interpretation. 
Correspondence experiments are widely viewed as providing the most clean 
and compelling evidence of unequal treatment in hiring (Riach and Rich, 2002). As 
argued in Section 1, any bias introduced by individual unobservable characteristics 
is eliminated because all the information received by the employer is controlled 
by the researcher. Strict equivalence between the fictitious job candidates is 
realised and unequal treatment in respect of employers is disentangled from 
other explanations of differential hiring outcomes such as differences in human 
capital and preferences at the employee side. 
Concerning the identification of gender discrimination, the extensive 
correspondence experiment conducted by Neumark et al. (1996) is seminal. 
Neumark et al. (1996) showed that, in the Philadelphian labour market for waiters 
and waitresses of 1994, female job candidates had, compared to males, a 
substantially lower estimated probability of receiving an interview in high-price 
restaurants and a substantially higher probability of receiving one in low-price 
restaurants (where earnings were also lower). In the same realm, Albert et al. 
(2011), Booth and Leigh (2010), Carlsson (2011), Petit (2007), Riach and Rich 
(2006) and Weichselbaumer (2004) studied hiring discrimination based on gender 
in Spain, Australia, Sweden, France, the UK and Austria by means of a 
correspondence experiment. None of these studies, however, attempted to 
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investigate heterogeneity in labour market discrimination by the promotion 
characteristics of the jobs for which the fictitious applicants applied. 
We conducted our experiment between October 2013 and March 2014 in the 
labour market of Flanders, the northern, Dutch-speaking part of Belgium. During 
this period we randomly selected 288 vacancies for jobs targeting Bachelors in 
business administration and 288 vacancies for jobs targeting Masters in business 
economics in the database of the Public Employment Agency of Flanders, the 
region’s major job search channel. We restricted ourselves to vacancies requiring 
at most five years of work experience. Two job applications of individuals with five 
years of work experience (in a first and current job), identical in terms of 
productivity-relevant characteristics but different in their gender, were sent to the 
selected vacancies. We opted for individuals with five years of experience because 
Sticky Floors are related to the start of job ladder climbing. Moreover, jobs 
targeted at people with a tenure of five years could be expected to be 
heterogeneous in promotion aspects compared to their current (starter’s) job as 
“at least five years of work experience” is typically asked in (more) senior 
positions. 
2.2 Construction of Fictitious Applications 
We created two template applications comprising a resume and a motivation 
letter for each of the aforementioned two academic degrees held by our fictitious 
applicants. We will refer to these (template) applications as the Type A and Type B 
applications. These types were equal in all productivity-relevant characteristics 
but differed in lay-out and details such as the mentioned sports club. To ensure 
that our job applications were realistic and representative, example applications 
of the Public Employment Agency of Flanders were used and calibrated for our 
purposes. 
The Type A and Type B applicants were single individuals born, studying and 
living in comparable suburbs of Ghent, the second largest city of Flanders. These 
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candidates graduated from tertiary education in June 2008 without any grade 
retention experience. In line with the vacancy to which the pair of applicants was 
sent, a specialisation was chosen.6 All of the applicants had graduated from 
University College Ghent (Bachelor in business administration) or Ghent University 
(Master in business economics). Since September 2008, the fictitious applicants 
were employed in a starter’s job in line with their academic degree and 
specialisation and with no job authority (see Section 2.5 for how we define the 
concept of job authority).7 
Furthermore, we added to the Type A and Type B applications the following 
characteristics: Belgian nationality, driver’s license, adequate IT skills, Dutch 
mother tongue, adequate English and French language skills and sport and 
cultural activities. In their motivation letters, the job candidates indicated they 
were highly interested, motivated and organised. Lastly, we appended a fictitious 
postal address (the combination of a real street in a middle-class neighbourhood 
and a non-existent street number) and a date of birth to all application templates. 
2.3 Randomised Disclosure of Applicant’s Gender 
To erase any dependence of gender differentials in call-backs on the application 
type, a typically male and a typically female name were alternately assigned to 
the Type A and Type B applications. We sent the applications in an alternating 
order to the selected job postings, with a one-day delay in between. 
We chose “Elke De Vos” and “Anke De Vriendt” as the names of the female 
                                                     
6 For the Bachelor in business management, the specialisations used were (i) accountancy and tax, (ii) finance 
and assurance, (iii) management of small- or medium-sized business, (iv) logistics, (v) marketing and (vi) legal 
practice. For the Master in business economics, the specialisations used were (i) accountancy, (ii) finance and (iii) 
marketing. 
7 The professions of “accountant” (ISCO-08 code 3313), “file administrator assurances” (code 4312), 
“management assistant” (code 3343), “legal file administrator” (code 3411), “dispatcher” (code 3331) and 
“junior marketer” (code 3322) were used. 
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candidate holding a Bachelor and the one holding a Master, respectively, and 
“Stijn Van Lancker” and “Stijn Van De Voorde” as the names of the male 
candidates. We made sure that the chosen names did not represent a different 
social background based on Bloothooft and Onland (2011) who linked the suffix of 
the name Dutch speaking parents choose for their children with these children’s 
later wages. 
We matched to each assigned name a mobile phone number and an email 
address. These were registered with large and commonly used 
telecommunication and email service providers. All fictitious job applications were 
sent to the selected real vacancies by email. In view of avoiding detection, we 
applied to no more than one job posting from the same employer. 
2.4 Measurement of Call-back 
Call-backs were received by telephone voicemail or by email. As we mentioned 
postal addresses with non-existent street numbers in the applications, we could 
not measure reactions from the employer side by regular mail. However, several 
Flemish human resource managers confirmed that, nowadays, employers rarely 
invite job candidates to selection interviews through the latter channel. To 
minimise inconvenience to the employers, we immediately declined positive call-
back. All reactions from the employer side received later than 30 days after 
sending out the applications were discounted. 
In our data-analysis, we distinguish between two definitions of positive call-
back. Positive call-back in a strict sense is defined as getting an invitation for an 
interview concerning the job for which one applied – this definition was adopted 
by, e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004). Positive call-back in a broad sense 
includes, in addition to the former definition, the request to provide more 
information or to contact the employer or the receipt of an alternative job 
proposal – this definition was adopted by, e.g., Kaas and Manger (2012). 
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2.5 Variation in Occupational Level and Job Authority 
Sticky Floors may translate into lower probabilities for females to make promotion 
in four dimensions: occupational level, job authority, wages and non-statutory 
benefits (Deschacht et al., 2011). As the two latter job aspects are not mentioned 
in the job postings in the database of the Public Employment Agency of Flanders, 
our experiment does not allow observing these aspects at the vacancy level. 
Therefore, we will focus on promotions in terms of occupational levels and the 
degree of job authority. However, at the end of the regression analysis presented 
in Section 3.2 we will include the average wage in the occupation as a proxy for 
the wage in the posted job as a variable explaining call-back rates by gender. 
Each of the 576 vacancies to which we sent two fictitious job applications was 
matched with an indicator of the occupational level and with an indicator of the 
job authority level. On the one hand, based on the information in the vacancy, all 
vacancies were matched with an occupation in the ISCO-08 classification system – 
ISCO-08 is the second-generation International Standard Classification of 
Occupations, based on a resolution of experts on labour statistics held in 
December 2007 and endorsed by the Governing Body of the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) in March 2008. A new job at a higher ISCO-08 1-digit-level – to 
which we will refer in the remainder of this article as its “occupational level” – 
than the current one was defined as a promotion in terms of occupational level.8 
                                                     
8 The reader will notice that, due to our choice of the candidates’ current job and our procedure of matching 
these candidates with vacancies (see Section 2.2), both the current job and the job for which one applied were 
closely related to their academic degree and their specialisation. So, observed (potential) occupational 
transitions are in rule vertical movements (i.e. transitions in job level) and not horizontal movements (i.e. 
transitions in job content). This is a desirable situation as, therefore, promotions in occupational level following 
our definition may not reflect non-promotional horizontal transitions. The most common promotions in 
occupational level observed in our data are those from accountant (ISCO-08 1-digit-level 3) and file administrator 
assurances (level 4) to financial professional (level 2), from management assistant (level 3) and legal file 
administrator (level 3) to administration professional (level 2), from dispatcher (level 3) to manufacturing, 
mining, construction, and distribution manager (level 1) and from junior marketer (level 3) to sales, marketing 
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On the other hand, the jobs for which our fictitious job candidates applied 
were classified in three categories concerning job authority following Hachen 
(1990): jobs with no supervision authority, i.e. no supervision or coordination 
tasks concerning the work of other workers (level 1); jobs with supervision 
authority but no influence on the wage or promotion opportunities of other 
workers (level 2); and jobs with both supervision authority and influence on the 
wage or promotion opportunities of other workers (level 3). As the current job of 
the candidates was at level 1, a new job with at least supervision authority (i.e. at 
level 2 or level 3) was defined as a promotion.  
2.6 Limitations of the Experimental Design 
Before answering our research question by means of a statistical analysis of the 
gathered data, in this subsection, we discuss some limitations of our experimental 
research setting. 
First, our design can be effective only in demonstrating gender discrimination 
in the first stage of the recruitment process. Because we simply analyse the 
content of first call-backs, we cannot translate our empirical results into 
divergences in job offers. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) however argue that, 
even in the case the recruitment process has moderate friction, one could expect 
that reduced interview chances translate into reduced job offer chances. Second, 
our design is limited in its focus on promotion transitions to other firms. Unequal 
opportunities in promotion transitions within firms, which cannot be investigated 
by means of an experiment in the sense of the one outlined in this section, may 
be characterised by other dynamics. Third, we test for unequal treatment only 
within the vacancies targeted at individuals with a Bachelor’s or Master’s degree 
in business posted in the database of the Public Employment Agency of Flanders. 
It is possible that unequal treatment based on gender is more (or less) apparent 
                                                                                                                                       
and public relations professional (level 2). 
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among employers who rely on other channels (such as social networks) for filling 
their vacancies or among employers who have to fill vacancies targeted at other 
profiles. However, we are specifically interested in the relationship between hiring 
discrimination against women and the promotion characteristics of the jobs for 
which they apply. As this third limitation causes, by construction, a similar shift in 
the discrimination measures for the selected jobs implying a promotion and for 
those implying no promotion, our main research conclusions remain valid. 
Fourth, the occupational level and job authority promotion dimensions 
defined in the previous section may correlate with each other and with other 
vacancy characteristics. As a consequence, descriptive statistics on heterogeneity 
in discrimination by these promotion dimensions of the tested jobs might reflect 
heterogeneity of gender discrimination by other dimensions. Therefore, we merge 
the gathered data with administrative data at the occupation-, firm- and sector-
level and analyse the merged data by means of a regression analysis controlling 
for potential confounders. 
3 Results 
3.1 Descriptive Data Analysis 
Table 1 and Table 2 describe the experimentally gathered data adopting the 
strict and broad definition of positive call-back respectively. We provide the 
reader with two frequently used statistical measures: the Positive Call-back 
Ratio (PCR) and the Net Discrimination Rate (NDR) (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 
2004; Neumark et al., 1996; Riach and Rich, 2002). 
Overall, in 88 (195) of the 576 vacancies at least one candidate received a 
positive call-back in strict sense (in broad sense). 32 (98) cases resulted in a 
positive call-back for both candidates, 31 (51) in a positive call-back for just the 
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male candidate and 25 (46) in a positive call-back for the female candidate only. 
The overall PCR is obtained by dividing the total percentage of applications for 
which male candidates received a positive call-back by the corresponding 
percentage for the female candidates. At the level of the total dataset, the 
positive call-back rate following the strict sense (broad sense) definition is 11%9 
(26%) for male candidates and 10% (25%) for female candidates. The resulting 
PCR is 1.11 (1.03), indicating that the male candidates got on average 11% (3%) 
more positive call-back in reaction to their applications. These ratios are not 
significantly different from one and so we conclude that, overall, employers did 
not discriminate based on sex. 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE. 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE. 
To provide the reader with an initial answer to our research question, we 
split our sample by the two aforementioned dimensions of promotion. First, we 
find significant evidence for unequal treatment against females when they 
applied for jobs at a higher ISCO-08 level than the level of their current job. In 
this case, the call-back ratio is 1.50 (1.23) saying that males got about 50% more 
invitations for a job interview (23% more positive reactions in broad sense). 
Stated otherwise, when applying for these jobs, women got about 33% less 
interview invitations and 19% less positive reactions in broad sense. This finding 
is in line with our first research hypothesis of more hiring discrimination against 
women when they apply for jobs implying a promotion. Second, we find no 
significantly unequal treatment for both subsamples by the promotion 
dimension related to job authority. 
The overall NDR is calculated by subtracting the number of applications for 
                                                     
9 0.11 = (32+31)/576. 
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which the female candidate was preferred from the number of applications for 
which the male candidate was preferred and dividing the result by the number 
of pairs in which at least one candidate received a positive call-back. The result 
is a net measure of the number of discriminatory acts a female applicant could 
expect to encounter per application for which at least one candidate received a 
positive call-back. Overall, the NDR is 0.07 (0.03) adopting the strict sense 
(broad sense) definition of positive call-back. Based on a standard χ2 test, we 
cannot reject the hypothesis that the candidates of both sexes were treated 
unfavourably equally often. However, if the NDR is broken down by the 
occupational level and job authority promotion dimensions, we get results in 
line with those based on the PCR. 
An explanation for the finding of no significant heterogeneity in the job 
authority dimension could be that for supervising positions (i.e. rather middle-
management than management) soft and social (leading) skills which are often 
related to women outweigh the aforementioned more “masculine” 
characteristics, mentioned in Section 1, in respect of employers. 
3.2 Regression analysis 
As, by construction, both the male and female candidate exhibit the same 
observable characteristics per vacancy, regressing positive call-back on the gender 
of the candidate (and vacancy and employee characteristics) leads to the same 
empirical conclusion as the one based on Panel A of Table 1 and Table 2. On the 
other hand, as mentioned in Section 2.6, the occupational level and job authority 
promotion dimensions may correlate with each other and with other vacancy 
characteristics and, therefore, the results presented in Panel B and Panel C of 
Table 1 may in fact reflect heterogeneity of gender discrimination by other 
dimensions. Moreover, due to the finite nature of our data selection, the 
promotion characteristics of the posted jobs may even correlate with the 
application type (A or B) to which the female candidate was assigned and with 
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whether her application was sent before or after the male application. Therefore, 
we further explore the experimentally gathered data by means of a regression 
analysis. Summary statistics of the variables used in this analysis are outlined in 
Table 3. 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE. 
Table 4 and Table 5 present our regression results. We regress, by means of a 
linear probability model, the probability of positive call-back on various sets of key 
and control variables, included as such and in interaction with female sex of the 
candidate.10 For reasons of comparability of the regression results, all explanatory 
variables that are interacted with “Female candidate” are normalised by 
subtracting the mean among the subpopulation of female candidates and, for 
continuous variables, by dividing the result by the standard deviation among this 
subpopulation. The estimation results for all variables interacted with female sex 
of the candidate are presented in Table 4 (using positive call-back in strict sense as 
an outcome) and Table 5 (using positive call-back in broad sense as an 
outcome).11 For each of the presented models we computed multicollinearity 
diagnostics leading to variance inflation factors lower than five, except for some 
sector dummies. In what follows, we first focus on the results of Table 4 and then 
compare these results with the ones in Table 5. 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE. 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE. 
In models (1), (2) and (3), we regress positive call-back on the dummy 
                                                     
10 We also performed estimations with vacancy fixed-effects and probit estimations. The results for these 
exercises are closely comparable to those presented in the main text and are available on request. 
11 We do not present the main effects for these variables for reasons of concision. 
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indicating a female gender of the candidate (model (1)); female sex of the 
candidate and a dummy indicating the posted job implied a promotion in 
occupational level, included as such and in interaction with female sex (model 
(2)); and female sex of the candidate and a dummy indicating the posted job 
implied a promotion in job authority, included as such and in interaction with 
female sex (model (3)). By construction, the estimations presented in columns (1), 
(2) and (3) of Table 4 reflect those presented in Panel A, Panel B and Panel C of 
Table 1. For instance, based on column (1), we learn that revealing a female 
gender lowers the chance on an invitation for a job interview with about one 
percentage point, which squares with the comparison of the positive call-back 
rates for males (11%) and females (10%) mentioned in the previous subsection. 
Furthermore, column (2) indicates that the gender gap in job interview invitation 
is about six percentage points higher (and relatively more to the detriment of 
females) in jobs implying a promotion in occupational level compared to jobs 
implying no promotion in this respect. 
Next, in model (4), we combine the explanatory variables included in model 
(2) and model (3). As a consequence, and explained by the correlation of the 
indicator variables indicating a promotion in the occupational level and job 
authority dimensions (Pearson r = 0.56), the finding of less positive call-back for 
women when they apply for jobs at a better ISCO level is even enforced. 
In model (5), we extend the set of variables included as such and in interaction 
with female sex of the applicant. On the one hand, to control for the 
aforementioned potential correlation between these variables and the promotion 
characteristics of the selected jobs, we include variables indicating applications 
that were the first one of the pair sent to the vacancy and that used the Type B 
template – as the templates differ by academic degree, we adopt a Type B 
dummy for each degree. 
On the other hand, we include a set of variables capturing employee and 
vacancy characteristics which may affect call-back rates and may be correlated, at 
least due to the finite nature of our data, with the promotion characteristics of 
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the posted jobs (see Table 3). First, we include an indicator of the education level 
of the applicant (a dummy indicating a Master’s degree) as both theoretical and 
empirical studies show that discrimination decreases with the level of education 
(Baert et al., Forthcoming; Bursell, 2007; Carlsson and Rooth, 2007; Taubman and 
Wales, 1974; Wood et al., 2009). Second, we adopt variables indicating temporary 
and part-time contracts, as uniformly mentioned in the vacancies in the database 
of the Public Employment Agency of Flanders. If females have a relatively higher 
access to temporary and part-time jobs and these kinds of jobs are less present in 
the tested vacancies implying a promotion in occupational level – Table 3 shows 
that this is the case – this could drive the results presented in Panel B of Table 1. 
Third, and related to the recent theory of erotic capital as a personal asset besides 
economic, cultural and social capital and the empirical evidence on gender 
differentials in labour market discrimination (Albrecht et al., 2013; Baert, 2013; 
Carlsson and Rooth, 2007; Hakim, 2010), we add a proxy for the gender of the key 
decision maker in the first stage of the recruitment procedure, i.e. the gender of 
the mentioned contact person in the vacancy. Fourth, we include, from model (5) 
on, the natural logarithm of the average number of workers in the firm in 2010 as 
a proxy of its size.12 We do this as some former contributions to the empirical 
literature on labour market discrimination against ethnic minorities report a 
negative relationship between firm size and hiring discrimination related to the 
fact that larger firms are more likely to have a dedicated human resources 
function and have therefore, on average, more standardised procedures for 
recruitment (Kaas and Manger, 2012; Wood et al., 2009). Fifth, we include the 
fraction of female workers in the job as one could expect that, as typically male 
(female) characteristics are particularly productive in traditionally male (female) 
occupations, unequal treatment should be more in favour of women in female-
                                                     
12 This proxy was obtained from the Bel-first database (Bureau Van Dijk) after looking up the company number of 
the firm in the databases of the Flemish business magazine Trends and the Belgian organisation of Self-Employed 
and Small and Medium Sized Enterprises UNIZO. 
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dominated occupations (Weichselbaumer, 2004).13 Sixth, to erase any correlation 
between the promotion characteristics of the selected jobs and the (other) 
characteristics of the sectors in which they were selected, we include 2-digit 
sector dummies.14 In total, 57 sectors are represented in the data. As is the case 
for all other mentioned variables, these dummies are included both as such and in 
interaction with female sex of the candidate. 
Column (5) of Table 4 shows the estimation results for model (5). We observe 
a substantial but insignificant coefficient with the expected sign for the 
interaction between female sex of the candidate and the variable “Temporary 
contract”. More importantly, however, is that the estimate for the interaction 
between female sex of the candidate and the dummy indicating occupational 
level promotion jobs hardly changes by introducing the mentioned variables. We 
also run model (5) without sector dummies leading to very similar results, which 
are available on request. 
Last, as announced in Section 2.5, in model (6) we extend the set of 
explanatory variables included in model (5) with the average wage in the job 
following the ISCO-08 classification at the 3-digit level in 2010.15 We get, however, 
no significant coefficient for this variable. This may point in the direction of no 
heterogeneity in gender discrimination by the wage of the offered job. Just as 
well, however, this finding might be explained by the fact that the average wage 
in the job following the ISCO-08 classification is not a good proxy for the wage in 
the particular posted job. 
                                                     
13 This variable is proxied by the average proportion of females in each occupation, following the ISCO-08 
classification, in the European Social Survey (sixth round). 
14 We use the Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community (“NACE”) at the 2-digit-
level. The sector code was, based on the name and the address of the firm mentioned in the vacancy, found in 
the aforementioned databases of Trends and UNIZO. 
15 Source: Directorate-general Statistics and Economic information of Belgium. We use the 2010 statistics since 
those of later years are not yet available. 
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The results outlined in Table 5, using the broad sense definition of positive 
call-back as an outcome variable, lead to the same conclusion concerning the 
interactions between female sex of the candidate and the promotion 
characteristics of the selected jobs. Thereby, we can conclude that the regression 
analysis presented in the current subsection confirms the descriptive findings of 
the former subsection. 
4 Conclusion 
In this study, we contributed to the literature by investigating the importance of 
employer preferences in explaining Sticky Floors, i.e. the pattern that women are, 
compared to men, less likely to start to climb the job ladder. It was novel in its 
approach to gather original experimental data on gender differences in promotion 
opportunities. More concretely, we conducted a field experiment in which pairs of 
fictitious job applications of male and female Bachelors in business administration 
and Masters in business economics with about 5 years of work experience in their 
first and current job were sent to real job postings in Belgium. As we sent 
applications to both vacancies implying a promotion in terms of occupational level 
and/or job authority and to vacancies at the same level, we were able to test 
whether unequal treatment of young men and women in the labour market was 
heterogeneous by the promotion characteristics of the jobs they applied for. We 
found significant evidence for hiring discrimination against females when they 
applied for jobs at a higher occupational level. For these jobs, females got, 
compared to males, about 33% less invitations for a job interview and 19% less 
positive reactions in broad sense. On the other hand, we found no significant 
heterogeneity in hiring discrimination by the job authority level of the posted 
job. In addition, based on regression analysis, we also found no evidence for 
heterogeneity in equal treatment of males and females by the average wage in 
the occupation mentioned in the vacancy. 
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From a policy perspective, we cannot deny that our results point in the 
direction of discrimination of young women, albeit only when they apply for jobs 
implying a promotion in occupational level. In Belgium, as in many other OECD 
countries, the legal framework to punish labour market discrimination is 
available,16 so that the main benefit seems to lie in a more vigorous detection of 
unequal hiring chances for promotion jobs. One could investigate whether this 
could not happen based on a systematic application of the method we have used 
in this study. 
As employees at a higher occupational level imply higher investment and 
(temporary) exit costs, our results may be related to the career penalty of 
motherhood (Budig and England, 2001). In this respect, broadening the concept of 
discrimination, to include dimensions about how jobs are structured and 
rewarded that have a disparate impact on mothers, could be fruitful. In addition, 
tax incentives could be provided to employers for reintegrating women who 
return to their job after maternity leave. 
Given our experimental design, our results can, by construction, not be 
explained by theories of (“old-boys”-)networking and sector segregation (Forret 
and Dougherty, 2004; Groot and Maassen van den Brink, 1996). Although we 
cannot rule out the possibility that these mechanisms contribute to Sticky Floors 
as well, our results suggest that awareness campaigns targeted at these 
mechanisms will not be sufficient in fighting gender inequalities in promotion 
opportunities.  
Authorisation: This research was reviewed and approved by the Ethical Affairs 
Committee of the Faculty of Economics and Business Administration of Ghent 
                                                     
16 See Bassanini and Saint-Martin (2008) for a detailed description of the legal and institutional anti-
discrimination framework in 23 OECD countries.  
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Table 1. The Probability of Positive Call-back in Strict Sense: Descriptive Analysis. 
Data selection Jobs Neither candidate positive call-back 
Both candidates 
positive call-back 
Only male     
positive call-back 
Only female 
positive call-back PCR t NDR χ
2 
 (No.) (No.) (No.) (No.) (No.)     
A. All jobs 
All jobs 576 488 32 31 25 1.105 0.802 0.068 0.643 
B. Breakdown by occupational level promotion dimension 
Jobs at same level as current job 248 206 18 9 15 0.818 1.226 -0.143 1.500 
Jobs at higher level than current job 328 282 14 22 10 1.500** 2.133 0.261** 4.500 
C. Breakdown by job authority promotion dimension 
Jobs with no job authority 328 271 21 20 16 1.108 0.666 0.070 0.444 
Jobs with job authority 248 217 11 11 9 1.100 0.447 0.065 0.200 
Notes. See Section 2.5 for a definition of the used promotion dimensions. The Positive Call-back Ratio (PCR) is calculated by dividing the percentage of applications for which male candidates 
received a positive call-back by the corresponding percentage for the female candidates. The t-test for the PCR tests the null hypothesis that the probability of positive call-back is the same 
for candidates from both gender groups. As two applicants contacted the same firm, the probability of the male applicant receiving an invitation correlates with the probability of the female 
applicant candidate receiving one. Therefore, standard errors are corrected for clustering of the observations at the vacancy level. The Net Discrimination Rate (NDR) is calculated by 
subtracting the number of applications for which the female candidate was preferred from the number of applications for which the male candidate was preferred and dividing by the number 
of pairs in which at least one candidate received a positive call-back. The chi-square test for the NDR tests the null hypothesis that both candidates are treated unfavourably just as frequently. 
*** (**) ((*)) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) ((10%)) significance level. 
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Table 2. The Probability of Positive Call-back in Broad Sense: Descriptive Analysis. 
Data selection Jobs Neither candidate positive call-back 
Both candidates 
positive call-back 
Only male      
positive call-back 
Only female 
positive call-back PCR t NDR χ
2 
 (No.) (No.) (No.) (No.) (No.)     
A. All jobs 
All jobs 576 381 98 51 46 1.035 0.507 0.026 0.258 
B. Breakdown by occupational level promotion dimension 
Jobs at same level as current job 248 156 45 18 29 0.851 1.610 -0.120 2.574 
Jobs at higher level than current job 328 225 53 33 17 1.229** 2.277 0.155** 5.120 
C. Breakdown by job authority promotion dimension 
Jobs with no job authority 328 209 60 28 31 0.967 0.390 -0.025 0.153 
Jobs with job authority 248 172 38 23 15 1.151 1.300 0.105 1.684 
Notes. See Section 2.5 for a definition of the used promotion dimensions. The Positive Call-back Ratio (PCR) is calculated by dividing the percentage of applications for which male candidates 
received a positive call-back by the corresponding percentage for the female candidates. The t-test for the PCR tests the null hypothesis that the probability of positive call-back is the same 
for candidates from both gender groups. As two applicants contacted the same firm, the probability of the male applicant receiving a positive reaction correlates with the probability of the 
female applicant candidate receiving one. Therefore, standard errors are corrected for clustering of the observations at the vacancy level. The Net Discrimination Rate (NDR) is calculated by 
subtracting the number of applications for which the female candidate was preferred from the number of applications for which the male candidate was preferred and dividing by the number 
of pairs in which at least one candidate received a positive call-back. The chi-square test for the NDR tests the null hypothesis that both candidates are treated unfavourably just as frequently. 
*** (**) ((*)) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) ((10%)) significance level. 
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Table 3. Regression Variables: Summary Statistics. 
 All jobs Jobs implying a promotion in occupational level Jobs implying a promotion in job authority  
First application sent within pair of female sex 0.500 (0.500) 0.506 (0.501) 0.520 (0.501) 
Application Type B of female sex 0.500 (0.500) 0.530 (0.500) 0.544 (0.499) 
Master’s degree 0.500 (0.500) 0.616 (0.487) 0.540 (0.499) 
Temporary contract 0.127 (0.333) 0.116 (0.321) 0.109 (0.312) 
Part-time contract 0.075 (0.263) 0.061 (0.240) 0.052 (0.223) 
Male recruiter 0.325 (0.469) 0.305 (0.461) 0.270 (0.445) 
Log(average FTE in firm) 1.472 (1.048) 1.501 (1.085) 1.510 (1.003) 
% female workers in occupation 0.550 (0.181) 0.497 (0.163) 0.490 (0.158) 
Average wage in occupation in EUR 4,098 (1,043) 4,787 (855.6) 4,813 (1,066) 
Sector number (NACE, 2-digit-level) 65.54 (17.51) 66.86 (17.29) 66.32 (17.31) 
See Section 3.2 for a definition of the listed variables. The reported statistics are averages and standard deviations in parentheses. 
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Table 4. The Probability of Positive Call-back in Strict Sense: Regression Analysis. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Female candidate -0.010 (0.013) -0.010 (0.013) -0.010 (0.013) -0.010 (0.013) -0.012 (0.013) -0.012 (0.013) 
Female candidate * Promotion in job level (norm.)  -0.061** (0.026)  -0.092*** (0.035) -0.095** (0.040) -0.106** (0.049) 
Female candidate * Promotion in job authority (norm.)   0.004 (0.026) 0.055 (0.034) 0.067 (0.041) 0.063 (0.044) 
Female candidate * First application sent within pair (norm.)     0.065 (0.048) 0.068 (0.048) 
Female candidate * Application Type B, Master (norm.)     0.061 (0.063) 0.061 (0.063) 
Female candidate * Application Type B, Bachelor (norm.)     0.046 (0.072) 0.044 (0.071) 
Female candidate * Master’s degree (norm.)     -0.030 (0.053) -0.032 (0.053) 
Female candidate * Temporary contract (norm.)     0.071 (0.059) 0.071 (0.059) 
Female candidate * Part-time contract (norm.)     0.019 (0.053) 0.019 (0.053) 
Female candidate * Male recruiter (norm.)     -0.003 (0.035) -0.002 (0.036) 
Female candidate * Log(average FTE in firm) (norm.)     0.017 (0.017) 0.017 (0.017) 
Female candidate * % female workers in occupation (norm.)     -0.003 (0.017) -0.002 (0.017) 
Female candidate * Average wage in occupation (norm.)      0.009 (0.024) 
Linear probability model Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dependent variable: invitation to a job interview Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector fixed effects interacted with female candidate No No No No Yes Yes 
Observations 1152 1152 1152 1152 1074 1074 
Notes. See Section 2.5 and Section 3.2 for a definition of the variables adopted in the regressions. The variables that are interacted with “Female candidate” are also included without 
interaction with this variable. Except for “Female candidate”, all variables are normalised (norm.) by subtracting the mean among the population of female candidates. Continuous variables 
are further normalised by dividing by the standard deviation among this subpopulation. Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the vacancy level, are in parentheses. *** (**) ((*)) 
indicates significance at the 1% (5%) ((10%)) level. From model (5) on, 78 observations are dropped due to missing values for the added control variables. 
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Table 5. The Probability of Positive Call-back in Broad Sense: Regression Analysis. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Female candidate -0.009 (0.017) -0.009 (0.017) -0.009 (0.017) -0.009 (0.017) -0.010 (0.018) -0.010 (0.018) 
Female candidate * Promotion in job level (norm.)  -0.093*** (0.035)  -0.102** (0.043) -0.085* (0.051) -0.109* (0.062) 
Female candidate * Promotion in job authority (norm.)   -0.041 (0.034) 0.015 (0.042) 0.034 (0.049) 0.025 (0.052) 
Female candidate * First application sent within pair (norm.)     0.160** (0.069) 0.163** (0.070) 
Female candidate * Application Type B, Master (norm.)     0.092 (0.097) 0.093 (0.097) 
Female candidate * Application Type B, Bachelor (norm.)     0.053 (0.102) 0.051 (0.102) 
Female candidate * Master’s degree (norm.)     -0.042 (0.080) -0.046 (0.080) 
Female candidate * Temporary contract (norm.)     0.059 (0.089) 0.059 (0.090) 
Female candidate * Part-time contract (norm.)     -0.005 (0.074) -0.006 (0.074) 
Female candidate * Male recruiter (norm.)     -0.067 (0.046) -0.066 (0.046) 
Female candidate * Log(average FTE in firm) (norm.)     -0.003 (0.022) -0.002 (0.022) 
Female candidate * % female workers in occupation (norm.)     0.028 (0.020) 0.032 (0.021) 
Female candidate * Average wage in occupation (norm.)      0.021 (0.031) 
Linear probability model Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dependent variable: any positive reaction Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector fixed effects interacted with female candidate No No No No Yes Yes 
Observations 1152 1152 1152 1152 1074 1074 
Notes. See Section 2.5 and Section 3.2 for a definition of the variables adopted in the regressions. The variables that are interacted with “Female candidate” are also included without 
interaction with this variable. Except for “Female candidate”, all variables are normalised (norm.) by subtracting the mean among the population of female candidates. Continuous variables 
are further normalised by dividing by the standard deviation among this subpopulation. Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the vacancy level, are in parentheses. *** (**) ((*)) 
indicates significance at the 1% (5%) ((10%)) level. From model (5) on, 78 observations are dropped due to missing values for the added control variables. 
 
